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PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS: TOLLING THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AS TO DEFENDANTS NOT NAMED
IN A PRIOR GOVERNMENT SUIT
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides private individuals with a right of
action for injuries resulting from violations of the antitrust law.1 Toward
this end, Section 5a2 allows the private plaintiff to use a prior government
judgment against the same defendant as prima facie evidence of a viola-
tion. In addition, during the pendency of a government action the Act's
four year statute of limitations' is tolled,' allowing the private plaintiff to
await the outcome of the case and use a favorable judgment to his benefit."
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the extent to which the statute
of limitations is tolled.
In filing an antitrust suit, a major consideration concerns the operation
of the statute of limitations against the proposed defendants. Where the
proposed defendants were named as defendants in the prior government
action, the statute is clearly tolled as to them, as of the time the Attorney
1 Clayton Act §4, 15 U.S.C.A. §15. "That any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has his agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
2 Clayton Act §5(a), 15 USCA §16(a). "A final judgment or decree heretofore or here-
after rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States
under the antitrust laws to the effect that the defendant has violated said laws shall be prima
facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15(a) of this
title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as be-
tween the parties thereto: Provided, that this section shall not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in ac-
tions under section 15(a) of this title."
3 In 1955 Congress enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the private antitrust action.
Clayton §4(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §15(b). "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections
15 or 15(a) of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the
cause of action accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date of
this section and sections 15(a) and 16 of this title shall be revived by said sections."
4 Clayton §5(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §16(b). "Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is insti-
tuted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws,
but not including an action under section 15(a) of this title, the running of the statute of
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during
the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, that whenever, the run-
ning of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 of this
title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred
unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause
of action accrued." Section 15(a), which is excepted from this provision's benefits, provides
for the United States recovering damages as a private litigant.
5 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, 281 US. 311, 319 (1965);
see quotation at note 31, infra.
General files the case. A difficult problem arises, however, if a proposed
defendant was generally involved in the conspiracy or transaction which
formed the basis of the government's complaint, but for one reason or
another was not actually named as a party defendant therein. It is not a
problem without solution, however, and the key appears to lie in a judicial
approximation of the Congressional intent underlying Section 5 of the
Clayton Act.
Basis of the Private Plaintiff's Right of Action
Congress instituted the private right of action in an effort to secure
more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.6 A successful plaintiff is
awarded treble damages, 7 attorney's fees, and costs.' In addition to being
provided with a prima facie case against the defendant (where the govern-
ment obtains a judgment),9 the plaintiff may use government pleadings,
transcripts and evidence to his own private advantage. ° Finally, the stat-
ute of limitations is generally tolled during the pendency of the government
action. Thus Congress made the private right of action quite attractive. In
essence, by making the private action lucrative and by placing the plain-
tiff in so strong a position, another enforcement agency has been created."
Hence, it would seem that these provisions should be broadly construed, 2
and any search for Congressional intent must be guided by this policy."
That this is the position of the Supreme Court is indicated in Minne-
sota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood 4 (hereafter re-
ferred to as Three M), which broadly interpreted the rights of the private
litigant. The question before the Court was whether the statute of limi-
tations had been tolled; a divided Court felt that it had. Citing Burnett v.
6 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, supra note 5; Bergen v.
Parke Davis & Company, 307 F.2d 725, 727-728 (3rd Cir. 1962) ; TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE
DAMAGE ANTITRUST AcTioNs §3.01 (1965).
7 See note 1, supra.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, 281 U.S. 311, 319 (1965);
16 CFR 132 (e).
11 Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. den. 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F.Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.
N.Y. 1942); Quemos Theatre Co., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 35 F.Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J.
1940); REPORT OF TnE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, March 31, 1956, p. 378.
12 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725, 727-8 (3rd Cir. 1962) ; Kinnear-
Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. den. 348
U.S. 912 (1955).
13 Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Corp., 211 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955); Fanchon & Marco
v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F.Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.Calif. 1955).
14381 U.S. 319 (1965).
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New York Central '5 the court stated the test to be, "whether the Congres-
sional purpose is effectuated by the tolling of the statute of limitations in
given circumstances."16 With this test even the dissenter, Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, agreed.' Thus it was crucial to determine the Congressional intent
underlying the private right of action:
Whatever ambiguities may exist in the legislative history of these pro-visions as to other questions, it is plain that in 5 (b) Congress meant toassist the private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from
government antitrust actions. 8
The corollary purpose of the tolling provisions of the second paragraphof Section 5 is to vouchsafe the intended benefits of related government
proceedings, and allowing the private suitor one year thereafter in which
to prepare and file his suit. 9
This general attitude was reaffirmed in Lek v. General Petroleum' where
the Court held that for the statute of limitations to be tolled the issues in
the private suit need not be identical to those in the government action.
Rather, it is sufficient that the matters complained of be substantially simi-
lar to those in the government action:
The private plaintiff is not required to allege that the same means wereused to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by thesame defendants. Rather, effect must be given to the broad terms of the
statute itself-"based in whole or in part on any matter complained of"(emphasis added)-read in light of Congress' belief that private anti-trust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement
of the antitrust laws. 381 U.S. at 318, 14 L.Ed.2d at 411. Doubtlessly,care must be exercised to insure that reliance upon the government pro-ceeding is not mere sham and that the matters complained of in the gov-
ernment suit bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's claim for re-lief. But the courts must not allow a legitimate concern that invocationof §5 (b) be made in good faith lead them into a niggardly construction
of the statutory language here in question. 21
Having demonstrated the Court's willingness to broadly interpret the
tolling provision, it should not seem so great a step to toll the statute with
regard to a defendant who, although not named as a defendant in the
government action, was a party to the conspiracy or transaction sued
upon. Prior case law, however, would appear to militate this view.
15 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
16 Id. at 427.
17 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, 381 U.S. 311, 335 (1965).
18 Id. at 317.
19 Id. at 317 quoted from Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569
(10th Cir. 1962).
20 382 U.S. 54 rehearing denied 382 U.S. 1001 (1965).
21 Id. at 59.
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The Restrictive Approach: Prior Case Law
The early case law had indicated that provisions of Clayton should not
apply to a "non-government" defendantY Sun Theatre v. RKO Pictures'
provided a basic expression of this point of view, the collateral estoppel
theory. Here the Court restricted the application of tolling to the defend-
ant named in the government action:
The second paragraph of that Section (5 Clayton) is designed to insure
injured parties the full fruits of the government's case by suspending
during pendency thereof, the running of the statute against a right of
action in favor of parties injured by the same acts. Although this para-
graph does not speak in terms of defendants in a suit brought by the
government, it suspends the running of limitations during pendency
thereof "in respect of each and every right of action based in whole orin part on any matter complained of" therein. Neither logic nor public
policy considerations permit us to say that the pendency of a govern-
ment antitrust suit operates to suspend the running of the statute as to
every party who participated whether locally or nationally, in the na-
tionwide combination condemned thereby without regard to whether
or not he was named therein as a defendant. Rather the suspensionprovisions must be construed in the light of what can be accomplished
thereby. Our hypothetical decree finds that A, B, C and D conspired
together to eliminate competition on a national scale. The decree is
prima facie evidence to this question only. P reaps the full benefit of
Section 5 if the statute is suspended as to the parties named. If a dif-
ferent result is desirable, provision for its promulgation is a function of
the Congress, not of the courts. 24 [Emphasis added.]
Thus the tolling provisions were held not to apply to the private defendant
who was not named in the government action. Although the Court broadly
stated the purpose of Clayton's protection of the private party's rights, it
ultimately arrived at a most restricted view of the benefits of the govern-
ment action. Thus, the benefit of tolling was limited to mere preservation
of the prima facie case and, therefore applies only to the defendant named
in the government action. The plaintiff's prima facie case, of course, flows
from the judgment in the government action and is necessarily limited to
that which appears therein. The Court called an application of the tolling
provision to the non-government defendant an extension of the provision
and in this way justified its refusal to act in the absence of explicit con-
gressional expression supporting the extension. The Court reasoned that
since such an application found-a basis "neither in logic nor public pol-
2 Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Pictures, 213 F.2d 284, 291 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Electric Theatre
Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 113 F.Supp. 937, 945 (W.D.Mo. 1953); Levy v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc. 104 F.Supp. 787, 789 (D.Utah 1951); Momand v. Universal Film Ex-
change, 172 F.2d 37,48 (Ist Cir. 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
23Sun Theatre v. RKO Pictures, 382 U.S. 54, rehearing denied 382 U.S. 1001 (1965).
24 d. at 291.
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icy," the private plaintiff was seeking not to apply but rather to extend
the statute. This, then, was for Congress.
Although not mentioned in Sun Theatre, an alternative approach
reaching the same result has been used, i.e., Section 5(b) (tolling) is
merely complementary to Section 5(a) (granting the prima facie case).
Therefore, the statute of limitations was intended to be tolled only as to
those items and persons mentioned in the government judgment, which
forms the basis for the prima facie decree.25 Thus the statute continued to
run for the benefit of those conspirators not named in the government
action.
Another restrictive interpretation, expressed in Steiner v. 20th Cen-
tury Fox,26 permitted the statute of limitations to be tolled only in identical
cases. That is to say, the statute of limitations will be tolled only where the
defendants and the issues involved in the government action are "identi-
cal" to those in the subsequent private action.
The Expansive Approach
It would appear that the restrictive approach and the cases decided
thereunder are no longer controlling. However, the change does not reflect
a judicial usurpation of the legislative function as the Sun Theatre Court
suggested. Rather, the mere judicial recognition of the intent underlying
the antitrust laws vitiates the logic of the Sun Theatre case. Following the
rationale of Three M, the Court now takes cognizance of the Congressional
purpose in enacting the private right of action, i.e., to better enforce the
antitrust laws. Thus, the crucial issue is whether the establishment of the
prima facie case or the tolling of the statute of limitations will substan-
tially aid the private litigant and aid in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws. Posing the question in such a way obviates any considerations of
identity of issues, and a new idea emerges:
In suits of this kind, the absence of complete identity may be explained
on several grounds unrelated to the question of whether the private
claimant's suit is based on matter which the government complained. In
the interim between the filing of the two actions it may have become
apparent that a party named as a defendant by the government was in
fact not a party to the antitrust violations alleged. Or the private plain-
tiff may prefer to limit his suit to the defendants named by the govern-
ment whose activities contributed most directly to the injury of which
he complains. On the other hand, some conspirators whose activities
injured the private claimant may have been too low in the conspiracy
to be selected as named defendants or co-conspirators in the govern-
ment's necessarily broader net.Y
25See Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, 95 F.Supp. 446, 454-456 (D.Utah 1949);
Steiner v. Twentieth Century Fox, 232 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1956).
26232 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1956).
27 Leh v. General Petroleum, 382 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1965).
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Thus, Lek v. General Petroleum2" held that the statute of limitations
would be tolled if the private action was merely based in whole or in part
on any matter complained of in the government action. In coming to this
conclusion, the Court reasonably construed legislative intent and was not
guilty of usurping a legislative function by substituting its will for that of
Congress.
Similarly under this expansive approach, the Three M Court rejected
the idea that the rights flowing to the private plaintiff are limited to those
found on the fact of the government decree from which he derives his
prima facie case. For example, the government action may not proceed to
judgment thus depriving the private plaintiff, under the proviso of Section
5(a), of a prima facie case. Yet even the government's initial action in
bringing the suit and investigating the facts may be of great aid to the
plaintiff under Section 5 (b).' Being deprived of a 5 (a) prima facie case,
the plaintiff may still use the government's pleadings, transcripts, data, and
exhibits to help him pursue his case to a successful end:3"
Moreover, difficult questions of law may be tested and definitively re-
solved before the private litigant enters the fray. The greater resources
and expertise of the Commission and its staff render the private suitor
a tremendous benefit aside from any value he may derive from a judg-
ment or decree. Indeed, so useful is this service that government pro-
ceedings are recognized as a major source of evidence for private
parties. 31
Again, such reasoning flows from a more expansive approach which seeks
to find and effectuate Congressional intent. Given this, support vanishes
for the proposition that the factors which limit plaintiff's use of the gov-
ernment judgment as a prima facie case (Section 5 (a)) also limit the ap-
plication of the tolling provision (Section 5(b)). Rather there is every
indication in Three M and Leh that the tolling provision is neither condi-
tioned upon nor limited to the preservation of the prima facie decree. It
would seem that a court should not hesitate in extending the tolling pro-
vision to the "non-government" defendant who is nonetheless a part of the
conspiracy which was the subject of the government action and which
caused injury to the plaintiff. 2
The "Non-government" Defendant: Tolling of Statute of Limitations
A recent district court decision concluded that Clayton 5(b) should
be so extended.3 That case involved six "government" defendants who
28 Id. at 54.
29 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965).
30 16 CFR §§1.131 et seq; 16 CFR §1.132 (3).
31 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965).3 2 Ibid. at 321.
33 State of Michigan v. Morton Salt, 259 F.Supp. 35 (D.Minn. 1966). Notice of appeal filed
Sept. 13, 1966.
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were named as co-conspirators and two "non-government" defendants who
were not named at all in the government suit. The Court held that the
statute should be tolled relying on the reasoning of Three M and Leh.
In this case, State of Michigan v. Morton Salt,34 the Court pointed to
the different purposes of the two subsections of Section 5. The Court
reasoned that the subsections are to some extent independent: while Sec-
tion 5(a) provides for the prima facie decree, 5(b) provides for all the
possible benefits of the government action being preserved for the use of
the private litigant. A 1955 amendment of Section 5 separated the pro-
visions for the prima facie decree and for tolling. The Morton Court did
not feel that the 1955 amendment required a repudiation of the Sun
Theatre logic. But it did hold that the prima facie provision (Section
5(a)) is separate from the tolling provision (Section 5(b)) and does not
limit it in any way.35 Since the basis of this decision was the Supreme
Court's approximation of Congressional intent as stated in Three M and
Leh, the Morton case seems highly authoritative. 6
Further support for the application of the tolling provisions of Section
5 (b) to the "non-government" defendant can be found in the wording of
the statute: ". . . the running of the statute of limitations in respect of
every right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part
on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during
the pendency thereof (i.e., the civil or criminal proceeding instituted by
the United States) and for one year thereafter. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
The statute provides for tolling "in respect of every private right of ac-
tion... ."" The District Court in Morton Salt did not focus on this word-
ing, though the Court did recite it. Where a statute speaks so broadly, an
expansive interpretation seems not only justified but necessary. "(E)very
right" would appear to include a right of action against any party to the
conspiracy or transaction which resulted in the private plaintiff's injury
regardless of whether included in the government's complaint.
In light of the foregoing, the question now becomes whether the "non-
government" defendant must be even associated with the conspiracy sued
upon in the government action. The answer to this question appears in
the statute's wording and Leh's holding that the private right of action
need only be based "in whole or in part" on any matter complained of in
the government action, read in light of Congress' belief that private anti-
trust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of
34 Ibid.
35 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood, 381 U.S. 311, 321 (1965);
Leh v. General Petroleum, 382 U.S. 54, 58; State of Michigan v. Morton Salt, supra note 33,
at 48-49; cf. cases at note 23, supra.
36 See notes 14 and 16, supra.
37 See note 4, supra.
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the antitrust laws." Thus, the defendant in the private antitrust action
must in some way be associated with the wrongs involved in the govern-
ment action.
Conclusion
A re-examination of Congressional intent can and does lead to a
broader application of Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act. And this is fur-
ther supported by considering the underlying principle of all antitrust law
as stated by Judge Learned Hand:
Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumedthat one of their purposes was to perpetuate and to preserve for its ownsake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in smallunits which can effectively compete with each other. 39
Nothing could better effectuate this purpose than an interpretation of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Clayton Act which permits lucrative, practicable
and feasible enforcement of the antitrust laws by the small businessman.
It is therefore concluded that where a person is generally involved in
the conspiracy upon which the government brings suit, Section 5 (b) tolls
the statute of limitations regardless of whether (1) the person was a de-
fendant in the government action or (2) the private plaintiff can use the
result of the government action as a prima facie case.
lames J. Milam
38 Leh v. General Petroleum, 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
3 9 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2nd Cir. 1945). The
Court cites this statement with approval in United States v. Vons Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 274
(1960) ; Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962).
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